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NOTES
HEALTH CARE PROXIES: NEW YORK'S ATTEMPT
TO RESOLVE THE RIGHT TO DIE DILEMMA
INTRODUCTION
It is uniformly accepted that competent adults have the
right to make decisions regarding their own health care, includ-
ing decisions that authorize termination of life-sustaining proce-
dures. 1 Problems arise, however, when a patient becomes incom-
petent and thus no longer able to make such decisions.2 Judicial
opinions in New York s and throughout the country4 have con-
' "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law." Union Pac. R.R Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). See also Gray v.
Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D.R.1. 1988) ("[tlhe right to control medical decisions
affecting one's body is deeply rooted in our country's history and tradition"); In re Es-
tate of Longeway, 123 IM. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989) (a patient has a common law
right to refuse life-saving or life-sustaining procedures); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529
A.2d 419 (1987) (all patients have the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment);
In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983), modified on other grounds by In re
Hamlin, 102 Wash.2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984) (right to refuse medical treatment en-
compasses the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment).
2 "Competent" is defined as "possessing the requisite natural or legal qualifica-
tions"; "able; adequate; suitable; sufficient; capable; legally fit," while "capacity" is de-
fined as an "ability to understand the nature and effects of one's acts." BLAc'S Lw
DICTIormiy 188, 257 (5th ed. 1979). In this context, capacity to make health care deci-
sions means the "ability to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of
health care decisions, including the benefits and risks of and alternatives to any pro-
posed health care, and to reach an informed decision." N.Y. Pun. Ha. ii LAW, § 2980(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1991). Although there is a slight distinction between the meanings of
competence and capacity, they have been used interchangeably for the purposes of this
Note.
' See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981)
(cases involving discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment for incompetents call for
substantive and procedural innovations in the law that are not for the courts to make);
A.B. v. C., 124 Misc. 2d 672, 477 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct., 1984) (the problem of with-
drawing treatment from incompetent patients should be addressed by the legislature,
rather than the courts).
" See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 123 IM. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (19S9) (the
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sistently recognized that the problem is one best suited for legis-
lative initiative.5
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Mis-
souri Dep't of Health6 underscores the vital importance of state
legislative action on the complicated question of how to effectu-
ate the wishes of terminally ill, incompetent individuals regard-
ing their right to die. Although the Court did affirm that compe-
tent persons have a constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining
procedures, it determined that where the patient is incompetent,
it is constitutionally permissible for a state to require clear and
convincing evidence of the patient's wishes to withdraw life-sus-
taining treatment before such wishes can be effectuated. The
legislature can better resolve the sensitive issues presented in cases involving the discon-
tinuance of life-sustaining treatment); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 385, 529 A.2d 419, 429
(1987) (the legislature is best suited to resolve the "fundamental societal questions"
presented in withdrawal of treatment cases (quoting In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 341, 529
A.2d 404, 407 (1987)); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 344, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (1985) (the
legislature could more effectively formulate standards to follow in withdrawal of treat-
ment cases); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 139, 660 P.2d 738, 752 (1983) ("the
[l]egislature is the body most capable of assessing the views of the people of th[e] state"
on issues, such as withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, that "necessarily involve s -
ety's moral standards as well as legal and medical issues"), modified on other grounds by
In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
5 However, despite the call for legislative initiative in this field, most courts, New
York being an exception, have been willing to address questions dealing with the right to
die. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 123 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989) (faced with
these cases, the court cannot wait for the legislature to act); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365,
529 A.2d 419 (1987) (until the legislature acts, the court must involve itself in these cases
and provide guidelines); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (in the absence
of specific legislation the courts may not properly avoid the issue merely because it is
troubling or difficult).
6 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
7 It should be noted that on December 14, 1990, a Missouri county probate judge
authorized the family of Nancy Cruzan to discontinue the artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion that had been sustaining Nancy's life since January 11, 1983. In the time since the
Supreme Court decision, three more of Nancy's friends came forward, all describing con-
versations they had with Nancy in which she said she would have wanted her life-sus-
taining treatment stopped. This additional testimony provided the requisite clarity
needed under the Missouri law. Cruzan Granted the Right to Die, Newsday, Dec. 15,
1990, at 3, col. 1. Nancy's feeding tube was removed hours after the decision was issued,
Feeding Tube Removed From Comatose Woman, Newsday, Dec. 16, 1990, at 15, col. 3.
Requests were made to resume giving food and water to Nancy, but the Missouri Su-
preme Court refused these pleas. Request To Feed Cruzan is Rejected, Newsday, Dec.
21, 1990, at 15, col. 1. Nancy Cruzan died on December 26, 1990, without ever showing
any signs of discomfort or distress. Death Ends Cruzan Family's Ordeal, Newsday, Dec.
27, 1990, at 8, col. 1.
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Supreme Court has thus permitted states to set up procedural
roadblocks that effectively constitute an involuntary waiver of
this right to be free of unwanted life-sustaining treatment. Six
days after the Court announced its decision in Cruzan, the New
York State Legislature passed an amendment to the Public
Health Law that had been pending for years, Article 29-C:
Health Care Agents and Proxies.8 This law promotes the right of
individuals to decide about treatment in accordance with their
own religious, moral and personal convictions. It enables family
members or others chosen by the patient to ensure that the pa-
tient's wishes about treatment are honored after the patient has
lost the capacity to express those wishes directly.
Part I of this Note follows the development of an individ-
ual's "right to die" in general, and in New York courts. As a
matter of legal principle, adults have an expansive right to re-
fuse life-sustaining treatment." However, as the New York case
law demonstrates, this right is, as a practical matter, terribly
constrained. Too often, an individual's wishes are not effectu-
ated by the courts once the patient has lost the capacity to de-
cide.10 Part II examines the development of the New York
8 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW, §§ 2980-2994 (McKinney Supp. 1991) [hereinafter PRoxw
LAW].
9 See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.L 1988) (court authorized removal
of feeding tube from patient in a permanent vegetative state); McConnell v. Beverly
Enter.-Conn., Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989) (court approved removal of nutri-
tion and hydration from a patient in a terminal coma to implement patient's clearly
expressed wishes); In re Estate of Longeway, 123 I. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989)
(guardian of an incompetent, irreversibly comatose patient permitted to exercise pa-
tient's right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947
(Me. 1987) (removal of feeding tubes allowed based on the personal intent of the then
incompetent patient).
10 See, e.g., In re O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988)
(patient's oft-stated desire not to have her life artificially sustained held not to encom-
pass a desire to decline medically provided food and water); In re Wickel, 159 A.D.2d
576, 552 N.Y.S.2d 437 (2d Dep't 1990) (petition to terminate life-sustaining treatment
denied for failure to show that the patient "unequivocally demonstrated a firm and set-
tled commitment" to such action); Vogel v. Forman, 134 Misc. 2d 395, 512 N.Y.S.2d 622
(Sup. Ct. Nassau 1986) (authorization to remove artificial nutrition and hydration from a
permanently comatose patient denied, despite repeated testimony that such mechanical
life support was against the wishes of the patient). This Note is not concerned vith the
rights of competent individuals to refuse life-sustaining treatment. The rights of these
patients have not been terribly constrained by the courts. See, e.g., Deal v. Syracuse
Veterans Admin. Medical Center, 729 F. Supp. 231 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (competent, adult
patient's decision to discontinue his use of artificial respiration was honored); Fosmire v.
Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 551 N.E.2d 77, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1990) (patient, as a compe-
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Health Care Proxy Law. An analysis of the statute shows that,
although the law is a dramatic step toward fulfilling the respon-
sibility charged to the states by the Cruzan ruling, it does not go
far enough. The law fails to address the broader issue of surro-
gate decision making for patients who lack capacity and who did
not appoint an agent. Part III discusses various alternative pro-
cedures that could have been included in the statute so as to
better ensure protection of an individual's right to refuse
treatment.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO DIE-AN OVERVIEW
In 1914, the New York Court of Appeals recognized that the
common law confers on all competent adults the right to deter-
mine what shall be done with their own bodies." At common
law, the patient lost this right of self-determination if incompe-
tent. Self-determination was viewed as a personal right that a
surrogate could not exercise on behalf of an incompetent patient
without clear evidence of the patient's preincompetence intent.12
Where there was no statutory law dealing with this situation, the
courts were forced to determine whether a person could exercise
this right, through a surrogate or otherwise. The courts have ex-
tended, by varying degrees, the rights of the competent surro-
gate which may be applied on behalf of the incompetent by de-
vising decision-making standards to guide the surrogate.
A. The Substituted Judgment Approach
Under the substituted judgment approach, the goal is to
have a surrogate ascertain what the now incompetent patient
would have done when faced with these circumstances, and then
effectuate that decision.13 The first time a surrogate was allowed
to exercise this right of self-determination for an incompetent
tent adult, had a right to decline life-saving blood transfusions).
11 The common law rights of self-determination and bodily integrity are grounded in
the law of trespass and battery. As Judge Cardozo stated in Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), "Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without the patient's consent commits
an assault, for which he is liable in damages."
12 See Note, In re Storar: The Right to Die and Incompetent Patients, 43 U. PiTr.
L. REv. 1087, 1097 (1982).
13 See In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 48-49, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1989).
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patient was in the case of Karen Ann Quinlan.1 4 In In re Quin-
lan, twenty-one-year-old Karen had, for unknown reasons, en-
tered into a chronic, persistent vegetative state with no possible
hope of recovery.15 The Quinlan court stated that "the only
practical way to prevent destruction of the right [to terminate
treatment] is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to
render their best judgment. . . as to how she would exercise it
in these circumstances. 1 6
The concept of substituted judgment was expanded, argua-
bly as far as possible, by a Massachusetts court in Superinten-
dent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz.17 There, the
court applied this approach to a patient who was profoundly
mentally retarded, a person who was unable to understand his
medical situation or to make informed decisions regarding treat-
ment. The court accepted this approach because of its "straight-
forward respect for the integrity and autonomy of the individ-
ual.""' The court reiterated that the primary goal of such an
analysis is to determine the wants and needs of the individual
14 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
5 Dr. Fred Plum, Professor and Chairman of the Department of Neurology at Cor-
nell University invented the phrase "persistent vegetative state." He explains that:
[V]egetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of
its internal controls. It maintains temperature, heartbeat and pulmonary venti-
lation, digestive activity, and reflex activity of muscles and nerves for low-level
conditioned responses. But there is no behavioral evidence of either self-aware-
ness or awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner.
In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 403, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (1987). See also Shapiro, The Case of
L.W.: An Argument for a Permanent Vegetative State Treatment Statute, 51 Oio ST.
LJ. 439 (1990):
Persons in permanent vegetative state demonstrate a total loss of cerebral
cortical functioning; they are permanently and irreversibly devoid of any
awareness, thought, or feelings. Thus, for permanently vegetative patients, per-
sonality, memory, purposive action, social interaction, joy, satisfaction and
pleasure are forever gone. Moreover, such patients do not and will never expe-
rience pain or suffering ... .A diagnosis of the permanent vegetative state
usually can be made with a reasonably high degree of reliability within weeks
or months after the original injury by a physician skilled in neurological
diagnosis.
Id. at 441-42. The author argues that a more "direct and intellectually honest approach
to terminating treatment of such patients may be to define them as dead." Id. at 448.
Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
's Id. at 751, 370 N.E.2d at 431. "It does not advance the interests of the State or
the ward to treat the ward as a person of lesser status or dignity than others." Id. at 746,
370 N.E.2d at 428.
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involved.""
The evidentiary standard that purportedly must be met in
showing the incompetent patient's intent or desire under the
substituted judgment approach is one of clear and convincing
evidence.20 Courts vary, however, in determining what types of
evidence will be admitted to make the determination. They
often allow the surrogate to rely on general statements made
long ago or even on knowledge of the patient's value system,
which the surrogate then uses to interpret the incompetent's
present preferences regarding treatment.21
B. The Best Interests Approach
Where no reliable evidence of a patient's intent exists, some
courts have determined that the substituted judgment approach
should be abandoned in favor of a best interests analysis.2 2 The
New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy23 was the first to
explicitly articulate this approach. Broken into two strands, the
analysis was to apply in cases where there was less than clear
and convincing evidence of a patient's preferences. Under the
"limited-objective test," the court held that life-sustaining treat-
ment may be withheld from the patient if there is some "trust-
worthy" evidence, rather than clear and convincing evidence,
that the patient would have refused the treatment, and the deci-
sion maker is clearly satisfied "that the burdens of the patient's
-9 Id. at 750, 370 N.E.2d at 430.
20 Evidence is 'clear and convincing' when it 'produce[s] in the mind of the
trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought
to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to
enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction without hesitancy of the
precise facts in issue.'
In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 407, 529 A.2d 434, 441 (1987) (quoting State v. Hodge, 95 N.J.
369, 376, 471 A.2d 389, 393 (1984) (citation omitted)).
21 See Note, Someone Make Up My Mind: The Troubling Right to Die Issues
Presented by Incompetent Patients with No Prior Expression of a Treatment Prefer-
ence, 64 NomE DAME L. REv. 394, 407 (1989). For criticism, see In re Lpngeway, 133 111.
2d 33, 59-61, 549 N.E.2d 292, 304-05 (1989) (Ward, J., dissenting). Judge Ward admitted
that "the substituted judgment approach is appealing because it purports to preserve the
incompetent patient's personal right of self-determination and bodily integrity." Id. at
61, 549 N.E.2d at 305. However, Judge Ward found that the "analysis is based upon a
legal fiction: that the incompetent patient actually chooses to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment, and the court and litigants simply effectuate or carry out the patient's intent." Id.
22 See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987).
23 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
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continued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits of that
life for him.' ' 24 Alternatively, in the absence of any proof of in-
tent, the "pure-objective test" is to be followed. Here, a surro-
gate decision maker is to weigh the benefits and burdens of
treatment. If the "net burdens of the patient's life with treat-
ment clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that the pa-
tient derives from life," and the treatment, if continued, would
cause the patient "unavoidable and severe pain," then treatment
may be discontinued.25
The calculations under the best-interests approach gener-
ally involve consideration of factors relating to the treatment de-
cision, including the patient's current condition, degree of pain,
loss of dignity, prognosis, and the risks, side effects and benefits
of each treatment option.28 Courts may even allow consideration
of the interests of the patient's family.27 The problem with the
best interests test is that the decision maker, in effect, becomes
a judge on how worthwhile the patient's life is, which under-
mines the principle of self-determination. 28 As a result, few
courts have explicitly adopted either strand of this standard."'
However, as a practical matter, many versions of the substituted
2 Id. at 365-66, 486 A.2d at 1232.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 365-66, 486 A.2d at 1232.
See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484
(1983) (surrogate may consider how a decision to discontinue treatment will affect the
patient's loved ones); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 415 n.10, 529 A.2d 434, 444 n.10 (1987)
("patient's likely attitude toward the impact of his or her choice of medical treatment on
his or her loved ones" is a factor for the decision maker to consider).
In re Longeway, 133 IML 2d 33, 48, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1989).
This standard was eventually rejected in New Jersey in favor of the subjective
substituted judgment test, since, by definition, patients in permanent vegetative states
do not experience any of the benefits and burdens that the objective balancing tests were
intended or able to appraise. See In re Peter, 103 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); In re
Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). However, these courts, in applying the subjec-
tive test, considered an exceptionally broad range of evidence. As one author has stated,
"[The point is that even someone critical of an objective standard is in the end unavoid-
ably drawn to it." Dressier, Relitigating Life and Death, 51 OHio ST. LJ. 425,429 (1990).
The author argues that the objective standard should first be expanded and then used by
the courts in their determinations. The author argues that the permanently unconscious
patient has no ability to experience life since, at minimum, some capacity for social in-
teraction is needed. Without such interaction, the patient receives no benefit out of con-
tinued life, regardless of whether treatment is provided. Thus, a patient lacking any ca-
pacity to interact with others should, under this standard, have treatment stopped. Id. at
428-29. The author's proposed enriched objective standard would take into account the
"absence of human cognition, love and awareness." Id. at 430.
1991]
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judgment model incorporate the best interests standard by al-
lowing evidence beyond the express wishes of the incompetent
patient.3 I
C. The New York Position
The New York Court of Appeals in In re Storar rejected the
substituted judgment test as an unrealistic attempt to determine
whether the terminally ill, incompetent patient would want to
discontinue treatment."' The court instead adopted an individu-
alized subjective intent test with a clear and convincing eviden-
tiary standard in order to ascertain, and then effectuate, the pa-
tient's clearly expressed wishes.32 The court reasoned that
because the mentally retarded Storar had never been competent
so as to be able to make reasoned decisions regarding medical
treatment, a surrogate could not possibly determine what his
preferences would be. Thus, the court would not allow Storar's
mother, who concededly had her son's best interests in mind, to
prevent the administration of painful life-sustaining blood
transfusions.
In the companion case to Storar, In re Eichner,3 the court
held that the wishes of the patient, Brother Joseph Fox, were to
be respected. The court based this decision on "solemn pro-
nouncements" by Brother Fox that he did not want to be main-
tained in a vegetative coma by use of a respirator. The court
apparently considered that Brother Fox's religious beliefs sup-
ported his views regarding treatment and that he was clearly old
enough to realize or feel the consequences of his statements.3 4
30 See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hasp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d
626 (1986); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983), modified on other
grounds by In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984). Justice Stevens's
dissent in the Cruzan case seems to support the inclusion of such evidence when making
determinations as to whether life support should be withdrawn or withheld. In his view,
the best interests of the individual must not be ignored by state policy. See Cruzan v.
Missouri, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2878 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 380, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 275 (1981).
32 Id.
33 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
11 Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274. The patient in this case,
Brother Joseph Fox, was a member of the Society of Mary, a Catholic religious order. At
the age of 83 years, Brother Fox suffered a hernia and agreed to undergo an operation to
correct the condition. It was during this operation that Brother Fox "suffered cardiac
arrest, with resulting loss of oxygen to the brain and substantial brain damage." Id. at
370-71, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269. Brother Fox fell into a permanent vegeta-
[Vol. 57:145
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The court emphasized that it was merely giving effect to the de-
cisions regarding treatment that Brother Fox had made for him-
self before he became incompetent, that is, to his subjective
intent.35
Viewed together, these two cases authorize the withdrawal
or withholding of life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent
patient only if there is clear and convincing evidence that the
patient had subjectively expressed the desire not to receive life-
sustaining treatment.38 The New York Court of Appeals in the
1988 decision of In re O'Connor,37 advanced an even stricter ap-
proach for effectuating the treatment preferences of incompe-
tent patients than the approach articulated in Storar. Rather
than accepting general evidence of the patient's subjective intent
regarding life-sustaining treatment, the court required findings
of a specific subjective intent as to the exact procedure in ques-
tion involved before allowing it to be withdrawn.
O'Connor involved an elderly hospital patient who, as a re-
sult of several major strokes, was left mentally incompetent and
physically disabled. Her two daughters sought to prevent the in-
sertion of a nasogastic tube to provide nutrition and hydration.
The daughters stated that such treatment was against their
mother's expressed wishes because, before becoming incompe-
tent, she had repeatedly stated that she did not want her life
tive state, requiring a respirator to survive. Id. at 370-71, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d
at 269.
-5 Id. at 378, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
" New York cases decided after Storar, however, appeared to be leaning toward a
substituted judgment analysis in determining whether life-sustaining treatment should
be withdrawn or withheld from incompetent patients. See, e.g., In re Beth Israel Hasp.,
136 Misc. 2d 931, 931, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (holding that the right
to refuse treatment does not absolutely require that the patient have manifested his or
her exact preferences prior to bjcoming incompetent). The Beth Israel court articulated
objective, rather than solely subjective, factors that should be considered in making such
determinations. Included among these factors were the patients age, his or her life expec-
tancy with or without the treatment, the degree of pain or suffering with or without
treatment, and the possible risks or side effects of the treatment. Id. at 940, 519
N.Y.S.2d at 517. The articulation of such factors followed the approach suggested in In
re Conroy, that is, a weighing of the benefits and burdens of continued treatment, 93
N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). See also Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center,:
129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1987) (inference that a patient's wishes not to
be artificially maintained in a chronic vegetative state with no hope of recovery encom-
passed a desire not to be provided with artificial nutrition and hydration).
-" 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
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prolonged by artificial means. 3s However, both daughters, as well
as a third witness, conceded that O'Connor had never discussed
providing food or water with medical assistance, nor had she
ever said that she would decline artificial life-support, if to do so
would cause her pain."
The court again explicitly rejected the substituted judgment
approach for asserting an incompetent patient's right to refuse
medical treatment, holding that it is "inconsistent with our fun-
damental commitment to the notion that no person or court
should substitute its judgment as to what would be an accept-
able quality of life for another. '40 The court therefore refused to
accept less than the clearly expressed wishes of a patient as to
the specific treatment involved before permitting the exercise of
the right to refuse treatment by a surrogate decision maker.
Statements made by the patient prior to becoming incompe-
tent could not be relied on as an expression of intent if they
were merely "immediate reactions to the unsettling experience
of seeing or hearing of another's unnecessarily prolonged
death"41 or if they were so general in nature as to fail to indicate
what the patient's precise intent was at the time the pronounce-
ments were made.42 However, this is the manner by which most
ordinary, nonmedically oriented individuals express their prefer-
ences. It was surprisingly relevant to the court "whether the in-
firmities [O'Connor] was concerned with and the procedures she
eschewed" at the time the statements were made were "qualita-
tively different" from those presented at the time of her incom-
petence.43 In so evaluating, the court took a view opposite to
that taken by most other courts which do not distinguish be-
tween the type of treatment administered. These courts accept
artificial nutrition and hydration as being equivalent to artificial
respiration and other forms of life-sustaining procedures."
" Id. at 523, 531 N.E.2d at 609, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
Id. at 527, 531 N.E.2d at 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
40 Id. at 530, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
41 Id. at 532, 531 N.E.2d at 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
42 Id. The court reasoned that the patient's statement that she "would not want to
be a burden to anyone" was of such too general a nature. The court indicated that eld-
erly people "frequently, almost invariably" make statements of this type. The court de-
cided that "the aged and infirm would be placed at a grave risk if the law treated such
statements as a calm and deliberate resolve to decline all treatment." Id.
41 Id. at 533, 531 N.E.2d at 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
, See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 587 (D.R.I. 1988) (there is "no legal
[Vol. 57: 145
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Courts have adopted the O'Connor standard in cases where
an individual attempts to exercise an incompetent patient's
right to refuse medical treatment;"5 this, despite the fact that
the O'Connor case involved a patient who was alert, able to fol-
low simple commands and respond to simple questions.4 As this
case demonstrates, the specific subjective intent standard is un-
realistic, unworkable and inhumane for almost everyone in-
volved in the treatment decision. Contrary to cases such as
Quinlan and Saikewicz, the O'Connor decision refuses to allow
the termination of life-sustaining treatment in situations where
the incompetent patient's wishes as to such treatment in general
are clearly and convincingly known, but the patient's feelings
about specific life-sustaining procedures are not known. This
difference exists between a mechanical device that allovws a person to breathe artificially
and a mechanical device that artificially allows a person nourishment"); Barber v. Supe-
rior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (no rational difference exists
between the administration of food and water and the use of a respirator or other life
support); McConnell v. Beverly Enter.-Conn., Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989)
(although applicable statute excluded the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration
from the definition of "life support systems," court held there was no logical distinction
between that and removal of a respirator and thus, allowed removal of a terminally ill
patient's gastrostomy tube); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497
N.E.2d 626 (1986) (the primary focus should not be the type of treatment involved); In
re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987) (the fact that artificial nutrition and hydration is
involved does not mandate a different result). See also note 101 infra and accompanying
text
4 See Elbaum v. Grace Plaza, 148 A.D.2d 244, 544 N.Y.S.2d 840 (2d Dep't 1989),
where the court applied the O'Connor specific-subjective-intent test and held that a gas-
trointestinal feeding tube could be removed from the patient, Mrs. Elbaum. Removal
was allowed because she had, prior to becoming incompetent, repeatedly stated that she
would not want the use of feeding tubes if she were in an irreversible vegetative state.
The court emphasized that its task was to determine what the patient would specifically
have decided, if competent, under the present circumstances.
" O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 525, 531 N.E.2d 607, 609, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888. These
facts were especially significant to Judge Hancock who concurred in the judgment that
treatment should not be withdrawn. He found that the "particular circumstances here -
e.g., the patient is neither terminal, comatose nor vegetative; she is awake, responsive
and experiencing no pain; and the prescribed procedure is relatively simple and routine
- would weigh heavily in favor of continuing the medically assisted feeding under any of
the approaches. . ." Id. at 535, 531 N.E.2d at 616, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 895 (Hancock, J.,
concurring). Judge Hancock did, however, sharply criticize the majority's approach as
unrealistic and unworkable. He proposed an approach that would require the court to
consider a wide range of factors, both medical and personal, before making a decision in
a particular case. Id. at 537, 531 N.E.2d at 617, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
47 See Nankivell, This Far and No Further: Is There a Constitutional Right to
Die?, 76 ABA J. 66 (Apr. 1990).
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position has been criticized as inflexible by both commentators 8
and courts in other jurisdictions."
If the specific-subjective-intent rule is applied literally there
is no realistic possibility that a patient, once rendered incompe-
tent, will have his or her wishes regarding treatment effectuated
by the courts. 50 This is so because the rule in fact demands an
impossibility. It requires a factual determination of the incom-
petent patient's actual desire at the time of the decision to ter-
minate treatment, that is, "what the patient would say if asked
48 See, e.g., Weir & Gostin, Decisions to Abate Life-Sustaining Treatment for Non-
autonomous Patients; Ethical Standards and Legal Liability for Physicians after
Cruzan, 264 J. A.MA. 1846, 1847 (1990); see also Spencer, Health Care Proxy Bill Gains
New Life, N.Y.L.J., June 29, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
19 See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989).
50 Practically, this statement applies only in instances where patients have left no
advance directives, and disagreement occurs regarding the decisions, since this is when
resort to the judicial system becomes necessary. Although the case law demonstrates that
the typical disagreement arises when the family or friends of the incompetent patient
wish to discontinue life support in contravention of the health care provider's policies,
the situation can be reversed, as evidenced by the case of Helga Wanglie. Wanglie, 87,
had been in a vegetative state with no possible hope of recovery since May 1990. Wan-
glie's family had refused to permit her to die. Therefore, authorities at Hennepin County
Medical Center in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where Wanglie is a patient, asked a state
court to grant the hospital permission to disconnect Wanglie's life-support systems
which they contended are inappropriate because they cannot advance Wanglie's personal
interests. See Life and Death After Cruzan, TnmE, Jan. 21, 1991, at 67; Fight Over Life,
Newsday, Jan. 29, 1991, at 63, col. 2. The court eventually ruled that the physicians
could not overrule the wishes of Wanglie's family. See Hospital Can't Pull Plug, News-
day, July 2, 1991, at 15, col. 1. Many cases, however, never reach the courts. Hospitals do
frequently discontinue treatment, based on clear and convincing evidence, in accord with
the family's wishes. A survey commissioned by the American Association of Critical-Care
Nurses (AACN) found that "sixty-five percent of the [critical care] nurses participate in
decisions about withdrawing or withholding life support at least several times each
month, with twenty-four percent taking part in such discussions at least several times
each week." AACN, Frequent Life Support Decisions Confirm Expertise of Critical
Care Nursing, Survey Reveals, Press Release (May 23, 1990). The American Hospital
Association has estimated that 70% of the 6,000 deaths that occur in the United States
on an average day occur as a result of privately made decisions concerning withdrawal or
withholding of life-sustaining treatment. Malcolm, Judge Allows Feeding-Tube Removal,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1990, at 10, col. 1. Despite the apparent frequency of such deci-
sions, it is estimated that, nationwide, 10,000 to 15,000 patients are being kept alive by
artificial means, at an annual cost of $1.3 billion. See Wagner, Right-to-Die Ruling Begs
the Question: Who Will Decide, MODERN HELTHCARE, Oct. 29, 1990, at 34. It has even
been said that the enormous amounts of money spent on caring for the hopelessly ill
should be limited so more money could be available to treat the poor. See Thornton,
Survey Says Elderly Overwhelm Healthcare System, Proprietary to the United Press
Int'l (June 25, 1990).
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today whether the treatment in issue should be terminated."0 1
In answering this question, the court has refused to examine any
evidence other than the patient's express statements regarding
treatment. It is simply unrealistic to expect ordinary individuals,
with no extensive medical knowledge, to be able to accurately
forecast what their future condition will be and what medical
technology will be available to save their lives under those cir-
cumstances. Not knowing what life-sustaining procedures might
be applied at some point in the future, incompetent patients
who desire not to have their lives artificially prolonged are
forced to have divined the unforeseeable.
Arguably, the O'Connor case was decided correctly based on
previously established law in New York. The Eichner and
Storar cases established that, in New York, only when a patient
had expressly indicated his or her preferences regarding the
withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment could
such decisions be authorized. In that respect, New York law al-
ready differed from the case law in most other jurisdictions that
recognized, in certain circumstances, the authority of a patient's
family or others to discontinue treatment. 2 The O'Connor court
did adopt the reasoning of earlier decisions. Indeed, the court
stated that the present decision "simply demonstrates that the
Eichner standard is a meaningful one." 3 However, the court
then proceeded to require even further that the individual's ex-
press preferences must specifically relate to the type of treat-
ment involved.
Unfortunately, as the dissenting judge in O'Connor stated,
this decision "substantially rewrites the law of self-determina-
tion." There will be relatively few individuals who can meet
the demanding standard imposed by the court. In these in-
stances, the court itself will decide that life-sustaining treatment
should be started or continued. This will occur regardless of the
" O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 530, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
See, e.g., Longeway, 133 fI.2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989) (guardian may exercise
the incompetent patient's right to refuse treatment); Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.D.2d 434
(1987) (a family member is the most appropriate decision maker); Colyer, 99 Vash.2d
114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (family member may use his best judgment to exercise the
rights of the incompetent patient), modified on other grounds by In re Hamlin, 102
Wash.2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 534 n.5, 531 N.E.2d at 616 n.5, 534 N.YS.2d at 894 n5.
"Id. at 539, 531 N.E.2d at 619, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 898 (Simons, J., dissenting).
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existence of other relevant factors that demonstrate the true de-
sire of the patient. Such a result is evident in the O'Connor deci-
sion where the majority dismissed the factual findings and infer-
ences made in both lower courts that O'Connor had clearly and
convincingly expressed her wishes, on many occasions, not to
have her life prolonged by any artificial means.55
The court refuses to accept the substituted judgment of the
incompetent patient's family or friends, professing only to ac-
cept the specific subjective intent of the patient. However, it is
practically impossible to determine accurately what the patient
would decide regarding treatment in the precise circumstances
presented. Even if an individual had, while competent, predicted
the exact circumstances he would later be faced with and had
repeatedly voiced his preferences regarding treatment, there al-
ways remains the possibility that prior to becoming incompe-
tent, the person changed his mind without informing anyone. If
the court is to allow decisions to be made regardless of this pos-
sibility, it should permit the choice to be made by people who
knew the patient intimately. Such a stance by the New York
courts would be more consistent with that taken by the New
York legislature, as evidenced by its enactment of Article 29-B
of the Public Health Law in 1987.6 The legislature has recog-
nized that the patient's spouse, children, relatives or close
friends are the ones in the best position to know the patient's
moral, ethical and religious beliefs regarding such treatment.
5 Id. at 545, 531 N.E.2d at 622, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 901 (emphasis in original). Here,
the court's review should have been limited solely to determining whether there was any
valid line of reasoning that could lead a rational person to the same conclusion reached
on the basis of the evidence. See, e.g., People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 508 N.E.2d 672,
515 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1987) (with few exceptions, the court of appeals, unlike an intermedi-
ate appellate court, passes on questions of law only, not questibns of fact); Humphrey v.
State, 60 N.Y.2d 742, 457 N.E.2d 767, 469 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1983) (the court of appeals is
without power to review lower court findings of fact if such findings are supported by
evidence in the record); Le Roux v. State, 307 N.Y. 397, 405, 121 N.E.2d 386, 391 (1954)
(lower court findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence of record, are conclu-
sive in the court of appeals). In the lower courts, the proper clear and convincing eviden-
tiary standard was used and the conclusions reached by the lower courts were amply
supported by the evidence.
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2965(4)(a) (McKinney & Supp. 1991) provides that if a
patient has not designated a surrogate, or if a designated surrogate is unavailable, certain
other people may serve as a substitute surrogate. The list of individuals authorized in
this situation to make decisions regarding issuance of an order not to resuscitate include
the patient's spouse, children over the age of eighteen, parents, brothers or sisters over
the age of eighteen and close friends. See notes 125-26 and accompanying text infra.
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This knowledge enables them to make most accurately the
choice that the patient would have made were he or she
competent.
New York courts have not adopted the substitute judgment
approach, and so an incompetent patient's family or surrogate
remains legally powerless to enforce the wishes of the patient
regarding life-sustaining treatment absent specific evidence pro-
vided by the patient before becoming incompetent. A patient's
statements may be completely disregarded by the court if they
were made in general terms, in casual circumstances, as a spon-
taneous reaction to another person's medical treatment or while
the patient was young and in excellent health.17 The Cruzan de-
cision legitimizes such an approach, thereby giving judicial pro-
tection only to those individuals who expressed their views re-
garding life-sustaining treatment in a manner sufficient to meet
the rigorous standards imposed by the New York courts. A legis-
lative determination recognizing an individual's right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment and providing a method for imple-
menting that right thus became vitally important in New York.
I THE NEW YORK HEALTH CARE PROXY LAW
A. Development
In March 1985, Governor Cuomo convened the New York
State Task Force on Life and the Law (Task Force). He asked
the Task Force to develop recommendations on issues arising
from recent advances in medical technology, including the with-
drawal and withholding of life-sustaining treatment0a The Task
Force realized that under current New York law, following the
loss of capacity, a person's intensely held feelings about treat-
ment may be subverted by "the emotional needs of family mem-
bers, the professional ethos of health care providers, or the poli-
cies of medical facilities." 59 Without some procedure to allow
individuals to express their wishes prior to losing capacity, the
course their medical treatment takes would be decided by
57 See O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 532, 531 N.E.2d 607, 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 893
(1988); see also Orentlicher, Advance Medical Directives, 263 J. A.MA. 2365 (1990).
IN.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, LirE.SuSrANIlNG TaTmENT MAJt-
ING DECISIONS AND APPOINTING A HEALTH CARE AGENT 1 (July 1987) [hereinafter TASK-
FORCE REPORT].
50 Id. at 14.
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others, rather than themselves." The Task Force thus concluded
that there was a "compelling need" for legislation in New York
State to ensure that individuals' wishes dictate what treatment
they receive, if any.61 The Task Force proceeded to examine the
different types of legislation that could be utilized in New York
to accomplish this objective.
1. Living Will Legislation
The purpose of a living will is to provide a written directive
to the family, physicians and hospital that life-prolonging treat-
ment should not be administered in the event the person be-
comes incompetent. Forty-two states and the District of Colum-
bia have enacted legislation recognizing the validity of such
prior written directives.6 2 New York has not enacted a living will
o Id.
01 Id. at 16.
02 See Alabama Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1990); Alaska
Rights of Terminally Ill Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (1986); Arizona Medical
Treatment Decision Act, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); Arkansas
Rights of the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-
201 to -218 (Supp. 1989); California Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
7185-7195 (West Supp. 1991); Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987 & Supp. 1990); Connecticut Removal of Life Support
Systems Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (Supp. 1991); Delaware Death with
Dignity Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); District of Columbia Natural
Death Act of 1981, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1989); Florida Life-Prolonging
Procedure Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01 to -.17 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); Georgia
Living Will Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1991); Hawaii Medical Treatment
Decisions Act, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1989); Idaho Natural Death Act,
IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4509 (1985 & Supp. 1991); Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 2, §§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); Indiana Living Wills and Life-
Prolonging Procedures Act, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns 1990); Iowa Life-
Sustaining Procedures Act, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 -.11 (West 1989); Kansas Natural
Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28.101 to -28.109 (1985); Kentucky Living Will Act,
1990, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 311.622-.644 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); Louisiana Life-
Sustaining Procedures Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1991);
Maine Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18a, §§ 5-701 to
-714 (Supp. 1990); Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1990); Minnesota Adult Health Care Decisions Act, MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 145B.01-.17 (West Supp. 1991); Mississippi Withdrawal of Life-Saving Mecha-
nisms Act, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1990); Missouri Uniform Rights
of the Terminally Ill Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 -.055 (Vernon Supp. 1991); Montana
Living Will Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -104, -11, -201 to -206 (1989); Nevada
Withholding or Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
449.540 -.690 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1989); New Hampshire Terminal Care Document,
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to -H:16 (1990); New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M.
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law. Therefore a living will is only enforceable in New York on a
case-by-case basis, where it can be offered as clear and convinc-
ing evidence of the incompetent patient's intent."3
There are significant drawbacks inherent in living wills.
living will is written in advance of the time when treatment deci-
sions must be made. It therefore cannot represent an informed
decision among different alternatives under the present circum-
stances." If a living will is drafted in specific language it cannot
provide guidance in unanticipated circumstances. If, on the
other hand, the will is written in general language, then its terms
may be held'too ambiguous and vague to apply to any particular
treatment.65 Furthermore, most statutes restrict the types of
treatment that an individual may designate in the living will to
be withdrawn or withheld. 6 It is also often specified that the
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986); North Carolina Right to Natural Death Act, N.C. Gm.
STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1990); North Dakota Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act,
NI). CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (Supp. 1989); Oklahoma Natural Death Act, OLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West 1991); Oregon Rights with Respect to Terminal
Illness Act, 0- Rv. STAT. §§ 127.605-.650 (1989); South Carolina Death with Dignity
Act, S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); South Dakota Living
Will Act, S.D. CODiFmD LAWS ANN. §§ 34-12D-1 to -22 (Supp. 1991); Tennessee Right to
Natural Death Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1990); Texas Natural
Death Act, Tax. HEALTH & SAFEr CODE ANN. §§ 672.001-.021 (Vernon Supp. 1991);
Utah Personal Choice and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118
(Supp. 1991); Vermont Terminal Care Document Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-
5262 & tit. 13, Forgery & Counterfeiting, § 1801 (1987 & Supp. 1990); Virginia Natural
Death Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1990); Washington Natural Death Act,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (Supp. 1991); West Virginia Natural Death
Act, W.VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1991 & Supp. 1991); Wisconsin Natural Death Act,
W. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West 1989); Wyoming Living Will Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-
22-101 to -109 (Supp. 1991). See also Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, §§ 1-18,
'9A U.L.A. 456 (Supp. 1990).
' Note, Living Wills in New York. Are They Valid?, 38 Snicusm L. Ray. 1369,
1384 (1987). See also Saunders v. State, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1985) (wishes expressed in a living will could serve as informed medical consent for
withholding of life-sustaining treatment in the event the patient became incapacitated);
but see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 58, at 77 (Task Force survey indicates that
despite clear legal support, many hospitals and nursing homes are reluctant to enforce a
patient's living will unless a variety of circumstances are met).
e4 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 58, at 75.
'l See Orentlicher, supra note 57. Even assuming an individual could write in a liv-
ing will that he or she desires no life-sustaining treatment whatsoever, the possibility
remains that such a statement could be interpreted as barring administration of only
those types of treatment in existence at the time that the living will was executed. Ad-
vancements in technology made after such a time would not be considered under such a
result.
See, e.g., Georgia Living Will Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 3132 (1989) ("Life-sustaining
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living will is not effective unless the patient is diagnosed to be in
a terminal condition, 7 which by definition, often does not apply
to patients in persistent vegetative states.
For these reasons, the Task Force concluded that, for pur-
poses of legislative action, living wills have value only in provid-
ing evidence of a patient's wishes in the event a healthcare agent
has not been appointed."8
2. Durable Powers of Attorney
Various states have either enacted durable power of attor-
ney statutes for health care6" or interpreted existing legislation
to include powers to delegate decision-making authority for
health care.70 The New York durable power of attorney statute
does not refer to health care decisions. 1 In 1984, the New York
Attorney General stated that a durable power of attorney, under
the existing statute, is an "uncertain vehicle" for delegation of
authority generally for an agent to make health care decisions on
behalf of an incompetent person.7 2 He did acknowledge, how-
ever, that such a power could be used to authorize another per-
son to communicate specific decisions made by the principal re-
garding health care decisions .7  The principal's instructions,
procedures shall not include nourishment or anything deemed necessary to alleviate
pain."); Missouri Life Support Declarations Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010 (Vernon Supp.
1991) ("Death-prolonging procedure shall not include . . . the performance of any pro-
cedure to provide nutrition or hydration.").
" See, e.g., Alabama Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE § 22-8A (1990) (act applies only
to a patient whose death is "imminent or whose condition is hopeless unless he or she is
artificially supported through the use of life-sustaining procedures"); Missouri Life Sup-
port Declarations Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (terminal condition
defined as an "irreversible or incurable condition which in the opinion of the attending
physician is such that death will occur within a short time regardless of the application
of medical procedures").
68 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra, note 58, at 81. There is legislation in other states that
combines a recognition of living wills with a process for surrogate decision making when
a living will is not available. See id.
"' See, e.g., Illinois Power of Attorney for Health Care, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 /2,
para. 804 (1988).
70 See, e.g., In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987) (interpreting New Jersey's
Power of Attorney Statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2B-8 (West Supp. 1989), as authorizing
conveyance of durable authority to make medical decisions).
71 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1601 (McKinney 1990).





rather than the delegation of decision-making power, are af-
forded legal recognition under this interpretation. Practically,
therefore, under New York's existing legislation, executing a du-
rable power of attorney is equivalent to executing a living will,
accompanied by all the inherent disadvantages. In addition,
powers concerning health care decisions would seem to be more
sensitive than property matters that are generally delegated
under power of attorney statutes. Particular rules and forms are
desirable and necessary for health care agencies to ensure their
validity and efficacy and to protect health care providers so that
they will honor the authority of the agent at all times. The New
York durable power of attorney statute, which does not contain
such safeguards, therefore is not a viable vehicle for delegating
general authority for medical decisions.
3. Appointing an Agent
The Task Force concluded that designing a separate statute
which would enable an individual to designate an agent specifi-
cally for making health care decisions was the optimal choice for
New York.74 On July 22, 1990, the Health Care Agent and Proxy
Proposal 6176-A was signed by Governor Cuomo.7 This law, ac-
cording to Governor Cuomo, was intended to give "adults in
New York an effective means to ensure that their treatment
wishes and interests will be protected if they lose the capacity to
speak for themselves. 767 This method has received the most pos-
itive attention, by both courts and commentators, of any of the
alternatives.7
The advantages of such a legislative scheme are apparent.
Appointing an agent to make health care decisions avoids the
difficulties that are inherent in living wills. Most importantly, an
74 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 58, at 80-83.
71 N.Y. PuB. H1TH LAW §§ 2980-2994 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
76 Governor's Memorandum on the Approval of L. 1990, ch. 752, N.Y. Lavs 2742
(McKinney).
See, e.g., Note, Living Wills in New York Are They Valid?, 38 Svimcusz L lt.
1369 (1987); Note, Appointing An Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84
COLUM. L REv. 985 (1984); Filling the Gap Where a Living Will Won't Do, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 17, 1991, at 39, col. 1 (discussing the advantages of a proxy over living vils); see
also Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Cruzan that "failures might be avoided if the
state considered an equally probative source of evidence: the patient's appointment of a
proxy to make health care decisions on her behalf." 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2857 (1990).
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individual is not required under such legislation to predict accu-
rately the medical circumstances he or she will later face. If the
individual becomes incompetent, an agent will be able to engage
in the same decision-making process that the patient would him-
self have undertaken. The agent will be able to confer with phy-
sicians regarding the type of treatment involved and the accom-
panying risks and benefits. Thus the agent will be able to make
the same type of informed decision that the patient would have
made if competent. If a patient has left instructions regarding
medical treatment, his agent will be available to interpret these
statements and resolve any ambiguities in the event the patient
becomes incompetent. Since the patient will have presumably
chosen a person he trusts to represent his interests there is no
substantial risk that the agent will disregard the patient's
preferences.
Health care proxy legislation benefits health care providers
as well as the individual patient. Although some courts have in-
dicated that, where all parties are in agreement, prior court ap-
proval is not necessary in order to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment from patients in irreversible vegetative
comas,78 as a practical matter, there is no way that physicians
who withdraw treatment from patients can be sure that they will
not later be subjected to liability unless the physicians have ob-
tained prior approval.79 The presence of an appointed agent, rec-
'" See, e.g., In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 139, 660 P.2d 738, 752 (1983), modified
on other grounds by In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); In re Storer,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 378-80, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274, (1981).
" Note, Discontinuing Treatment of Comatose Patients Who Have Not Executed
Living Wills, 19 Lov. LA.L. Rav. 61 (1985). See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App.
3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983), where a physician was criminally prosecuted for with-
drawing life-sustaining treatment even though he had obtained the consent of the family.
Although the charges were eventually dismissed, the fear of criminal prosecution remains
in the hearts of physicians. This concern can be attributed, in part, to the perceived
"willingness of local prosecutors to aggressively pursue cases involving the withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment" and to the arguments advanced by pro-life advocates. TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 58, at 10. But see Weir & Gostin, supra note 48 (arguing that
the threat of liability for abating life-sustaining treatment has been greatly exaggerated).
The threat of physician liability can also apply in the opposite situation. At least two
courts have recognized that physicians may be sued for imposing life-sustaining treat-
ment against the wishes of the patient or the patient's surrogates. See Leach v. Shapiro,
13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984)(physicians failure to obtain family's con-
sent before placing patient on a respirator, in the absence of an emergency, gives rise to a
cause of action for battery); Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, 184 Cal.
App. 3d 961, 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1986)(physicians continued efforts to sustain the pa-
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ognized by the law to have the power to give such approval,
would afford doctors and hospitals greater legal protection. As a
result, decisions could be made by physicians and agents with-
out resorting to the court system with its inherent costs and
delay.
B. The New York State Law
1. Specific Provisions
As enacted, the Proxy Law specifically authorizes any com-
petent adult (the "principal") to appoint a health care agent by
executing a form that, once signed and witnessed, delegates the
principal's power to make health care decisions.8 0 It is only upon
a determination that the principal lacks capacity that the
agent's power becomes effective."s The agent has power to make
health care decisions on behalf of the principal only to the ex-
tent that such decisions are consistent with the known wishes, as
well as the religious and moral beliefs, of the principal.2 In the
event that the principal's wishes are not reasonably known and
cannot reasonably be determined, the agent may act in accor-
dance with the principal's best interests.8
tient's life could have given rise to causes of action for battery, violation of the patient's
constitutional right to privacy and breach of fiduciary duty had the patient's death not
extinguished the right to claim damages for pain and suffering). The Bartling court, in a
separate decision, also recognized that a hospital could be ordered to pay legal fees in-
curred by a patient's wife in enforcing her husband's right to have life-sustaining treat-
ment withdrawn. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, 184 Cal. App. 3d 97,
228 CaL Rptr. 847 (1986). In addition, a recent court decision held that a nursing home
may not bill for medical treatment provided against the patient's wishes. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 16, 1990, at B1, col. 5.
80 PRoxY LAw, supra note 8, § 2981(2).
81 Id. § 2981(4). Section 2983 sets forth that a "determination that a principal lacks
capacity to make health care decisions shall be made by the attending physician to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty" Id. §2983(1)(a). The physician must set forth, in
writing, any opinions regarding the cause, nature, extent and probable duration of the
principal's incapacity. Id. Another physician must confirm such a designation of incapac-
ity in cases involving decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment. Id.
2 Id. § 2982(2)(a).
Id. §2982(2)(b). By mandating that the surrogate act in the patient's best-inter-
ests, the legislature in effect places more restrictions on the decision than if the patient
were to personally make the determination. If a competent individual unequivocally ex-
presses an intent to decline life support, the decision will be honored, even when clearly
contradicted by the existing circumstances. An objective best interests approach allows
the surrogate to consider not only the patient's past expressions of intent but also the
facts involved in the particular instance. The results of such evaluations would protect
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The law effectively eliminates some of the risks inherent in
appointing an agent to make medical decisions. Special proceed-
ings are authorized for determining the validity of a health care
proxy.8 4 An agent may be removed on grounds that he or she is
not reasonably available, willing or competent to fulfill his or her
obligations or that he or she is acting in bad faith.85 Further-
more the agent's decision can be overridden."6 The possibilities
that an agent will make an irrational or uninformed decision are
thus significantly minimized. 7 The law also confers upon the
principal the right to revoke the proxy at any time.8 8 This power
eliminates the dangers that the principal's preferences regarding
treatment will significantly change in the period between the ex-
ecution of the proxy and when the agent's services are actually
required, a period that could span many years. Furthermore, in
specifically providing immunity for health care providers and
agents for honoring and making good faith determinations re-
garding withdrawal or removal of life-sustaining procedures,89
the law ensures that such decisions will be made.
2. Barriers to Effectiveness
The drafters of the Proxy Law attempted to make the pro-
cess of appointing a medical agent as simple as possible for the
principal. In doing so, they included within the statute a model
form for individuals to follow when drafting their proxies.90 Spe-
cialized proxy forms designed by attorneys for their clients, how-
ever, may contain superfluous legal terms that a health care pro-
incompetent patients who retain significant interests in continued life as well as prevent
unwarranted treatment. See Dresser, supra note 29, at 431-34 (discussing this problem
in the context of living wills).
" PROXY LAW, supra note 8, § 2992(1). The special proceeding may be commenced
pursuant to article four of the N.Y. CiV. PRAC. L. & R. Id.
81 Id. § 2992(2)(a), (b).
86 Id. § 2992(3). This provision which provides for a special proceeding in court is
problematic in that it makes no exceptions for emergency situations. By the time a court
resolves the conflict between the surrogate and those challenging his decision, the condi-
tion of the patient may have irreversibly deteriorated or the patient may have already
died.
.. See Note, supra note 77, at 1005-06 (advocating the safeguards the PROXY LAW has
adopted).
8 PRoxY LAW, supra note 8, § 2985.
" Id. § 2986.
90 Id. § 2981(5)(d).
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vider might not understand. 1 Furthermore, individuals who
want to appoint an agent to make medical decisions for them
might not have access to the model form, or even to an attorney.
In such cases, the proxies they draft might be so vague or gener-
alized as to prevent health care providers from following them
for fear of subsequent liability.
The statute also requires that the proxy be signed in front
of two witnesses.92 Unlike a last will and testament, the princi-
pal may not merely acknowledge his or her signature to the wit-
nesses, but must also sign the proxy in the presence of these
witnesses.9 s The person appointed as agent is not permitted to
attest to the proxy.9 As one commentator suggests, this prohibi-
tion also seems to run counter to the policy behind easy execu-
tion.95 A health care agent appointed by the principal because of
a special, trusting relationship, is less like a will beneficiary than
a fiduciary, who is permitted to witness a will in which he or she
is named.9
One of the most significant barriers to enforcement of an
incompetent's wishes through the proxy mechanism is the re-
quirement that the principal's preferences regarding artificial
nutrition and hydration must be specified before his or her
agent is deemed to have the authority to decide these ques-
tions."' This limitation on artificial nutrition and hydration was
not included in the original legislation proposed by the Task
Force."'
The Task Force believed "that competent adults should be
free to determine the extent of the authority they wish to dele-
gate. . .[since] such a policy recognizes the individual's interest
in self-determination and enhances the individual's ability to di-
See Miller, New York State's Health Care Proxy Law, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 16, 1990, at
1, col 1.
92 PROXY LAw, supra note 8, § 2981(2)(a).
91 Id. In New York, a Testator has the choice of affixing his signature to his will in
the presence of each of the attesting witnesses or acknowledging to each of them that his
signature was affixed by him or at his direction. See N.Y. EsT. PowERs & TnusTs LAw §
3-2.1(a)(2) (McKinney 1990).
" PRoxY LAw, supra note 8, § 2981(2)(a).
" Angell, Health Care Proxies: Practical Considerations, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 27,1990, at
1, coL 1.
N.Y. EsT. PowERs & TRusTs LAw § 3-3.2 (McKinney 1990).
7PROXY LAW, supra note 8, § 2982(2)(b).
93 TASK FoRCE REpoR, supra note 57, at 152 (§ 3.1 Scope of Authority).
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rect health care matters in accordance with personal concerns,
values and life goals."99 Only when an agent can exercise those
same powers that the patient could have exercised if competent
is the goal of preserving patient self-determination achieved.
With this consideration in mind, the Task Force provision con-
cerning the agent's powers provided that the agent must be
given the power to make any decisions on behalf of the princi-
pal, even those regarding artificial nutrition and hydration, un-
less the principal has expressly indicated otherwise. 00 The en-
acted statute takes the opposite approach, which, as one
commentator observed, appears to be the product of an unfortu-
nate, last minute legislative compromise.1 01 The view of the New
York State Legislature, as expressed in the provision regarding
artificial nutrition and hydration, thus contravenes the widely
accepted view that such a procedure should not be singled out
from other forms of life-sustaining medical procedures.102
"Id. at 90.
100 Id. at 152 (§ 3.1 Scope of Agent's Authority).
101 Angell, supra, note 95.
102 It may be difficult to regard the termination of nutrients as merely allowing nat-
ural causes to operate. The removal of a respirator does not, in every instance, result in
death whereas terminating artificial nutrition and hydration is generally fatal. Death re-
sulting from the termination of artificial nutrition and hydration is also sometimes
thought to be extremely painful. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398
Mass. 417, 444, 497 N.E.2d 626, 641 (1986) (Lynch, J., dissenting in part)(describing in
detail the likely results when nutrition and hydration are withdrawn). However, death by
suffocation, that is, from the removal of a respirator, is also not painless; it just occurs in
a shorter period of time. In addition, such "tube feeding" may cause serious complica-
tions such as pneumonia. Patients often react adversely to the insertion of these tubes
and have to be restrained to prevent them from dislodging them. Realistically, artificial
nutrition and hydration is not akin to natural feeding, it is mechanical medical treat-
ment. See Note, A Necessary Compromise: The Right to Forego Artificial Nutrition and
Hydration Under Maryland's Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, 47 MD. L. REv. 1188,
1191-92 (1988) (arguing that legislatures should distinguish between artificial and natu-
ral forms of nutrition and hydration). The American Medical Association's Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs has concluded that artificially provided nutrition and hydra-
tion constitute medical treatment. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 217, 741
P.2d 674, 684 (1987). The Council's statement, issued March 15, 1986, stated:
Even if death is not imminent but a patient's coma is beyond doubt irreversi-
ble and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the diagnosis
and with the concurrence of those who have responsibility for the care of the
patient it is not unethical to discontinue all means of life prolonging medical
treatment. Life prolonging treatment includes medication and artificially or
technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration.
Id. (emphasis in original). This position is consistent with the views of other prominent
organizations and commissions. See Orentlicher, Cruzan v. Director of Missouri Dep't of
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3. Limitations of the Proxy Law
The New York statute articulates a means for its citizens to
choose a natural death under certain circumstances. In addition,
the statute specifically provides that the failure to appoint a
health care agent does not create a presumption that a patient
wishes continued medical treatment.10 3 The statute also adopts a
relatively relaxed standard, as compared to that articulated
under New York case law, for allowing an agent to determine
the preferences of the principal. Under the statute, an agent is
expressly bound to follow a substituted judgment/best interests
procedure. 1°4 This standard is consistent with the New York
Legislature's stance, which allows individuals to die with dignity.
Unfortunately, the statute only provides a means for effectuat-
ing this right for competent adults who follow its requirements.
The legislature's decision affords little protection to children, to
victims of unexpected accidents, to people who neglect to desig-
nate an agent, or to the many individuals who may not know of,
or have, anyone sufficiently close to them to whom they can en-
trust such critical decisions.""5
Furthermore, although the statute creates a duty on the
Health- An Ethical and Legal Perspective, 262 J. A.M.A. 2928 (1939). The Supreme
Court in Cruzan found that the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment encom-
passes the right to refuse technologically delivered food and water. Cruzan v. Missouri
Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The New York
courts have even taken a similar approach. In Delia v. Westchester County Medical
Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1987), the court held that the common
law right to refuse medical treatment included the right to forego artificial nutrition and
hydration, and consequently, the patient's wife was entitled to act in accordance with the
patient's prior, clearly expressed, wishes and have his feeding and hydration tubes
disconnected.
103 PROXY LAW, supra note 8, § 2989.
104 Id. § 2982(2). Under this dual standard, the agent is bound to conform his or her
decisions to the patient's expressed wishes, values, preferences or beliefs. The agent
should also evaluate all of the available alternatives and decide which course of treat-
ment is in the best interest of the patient in the event the patient's vishes are unclear.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 58, at 91-92.
I'l This lack of protection is especially evident when dealing with nursing home pa-
tients. Many of these individuals have no family, and the law does not permit them to
designate hospital employees, which may extend to members of the nursing home staff,
often the only people they know or feel close to, as their surrogates3. PRoxy LAw, supra
note 8, § 2981(3)(a). A physician may act as an agent provided he relinquishes his role as
attending physician after the authority under the health care proxy commences Id. §




part of the Commissioner of Health to prepare a statement sum-
marizing the rights the statute creates and to furnish such state-
ment to patients upon admission to hospitals, e10 the fact remains
that many people will remain unaware of this legislation. Of
those who do know of the opportunity to appoint an agent,
many will delay execution of a proxy until it is too late.
Whatever the reason, be it lack of knowledge, fear, or even lazi-
ness, the health care proxy will all too often go unused by those
who could benefit from it.' 07 In view of the current state of New
York case law on this subject, individuals who either fail to or
are not permitted to appoint an agent run the risk of having
their treatment preferences ignored. Without a proxy appoint-
ment, family members or others will have no legal authority to
forego life-sustaining treatment on the incompetent's behalf. In-
stead, clear and convincing evidence of the specific, express
wishes of the incompetent will be the sole legal basis for discon-
tinuing treatment.108
III. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
For many individuals, lack of physical control and an inabil-
ity to maintain even minimal intellectual functions would engen-
der an unacceptable loss of dignity; few would welcome such ut-
ter dependence on machines, as well as on other persons, for
survival.109 These individuals would want to lessen the suffering
of those closest to them and to be remembered as they once
were. 10 Such sentiments are felt by many, not just those who
utilize the statutory methods to prevent this situation, nor sim-
ply those who are, by law, permitted to do so. Procedures should
be implemented to ensure that all individuals may have their
wishes effectuated.
800 Id. § 2994.
102 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2875 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Barber v. Superior
Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016, 194 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (1983)). The results of an
empirical study conducted by one commentator suggest that advance directives, under
the current state of the law, have not had a significant impact on the way physicians
treat incompetent patients. Too few patients have executed advance directives to cause
physicians to become familiar with either the instruments themselves, or the laws gov-
erning them. See Zinberg, Decisions for the Dying: An Empirical Study of Physicians'
Responses to Advance Directives, 13 VT. L. Rav. 445, 452 (1989).
108 See Miller, supra note 91.
Orentlicher, supra note 102, at 2928-30.
110 Id. at 2929.
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At the present time in New York, inevitably the courts are
involved whenever an incompetent has failed to execute a health
care proxy and health care providers cannot agree with the pa-
tient's family regarding decisions to withhold or suspend life-
sustaining treatment. Arguably, the ultimate decision-making
responsibility should not be shifted away from the courts, which
presumably provide a detached but searching investigation in
deciding such questions of life and death."" However, many
courts take the opposite view.112 These courts realize that the
judiciary is not the proper forum for resolving these types of
cases, as these cases necessarily have serious time-constraints,
and involve complex issues, both medical and social, that are
better left to those with more expertise in the area.11 3
To prevent resort to the judicial system, it might be benefi-
cial to require an individual's physician to initiate discussion
and advise patients of the availability of advance directives and
the possible decisions that making them would entail.1 4 Studies
have shown that patients want to discuss the use of life-sus-
taining treatment with their physicians. 21 1 The physician can de-
scribe to the patient what terminal illnesses and conditions of
permanent unconsciousness encompass, while, at the same time,
recording the patient's reactions in the patient's medical
records. This can provide the clear and convincing evidence re-
quired in the event the patient becomes incompetent without
" See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (courts should be entrusted with decisions whether to continue
artificial life support, rather than the patient's family, or any others).
"12 See, e.g. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring); Rasmussen v. Flem-
ing, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987); In re Longeway, 123 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292
(1989); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d at 434 (1987).
3 See Longeway, 123 IML 2d at 39, 549 N.E.2d at 295. See also Vitiello, On Letting
Seriously IL Minors Die: A Review of Louisiana's Natural Death Act, 31 Loy. L. Ray.
67, 82 (1985) (Judicial review is expensive and time-consuming- "it can disrupt the pro-
cess of providing care for the patient.., it can create unnecessary strains in the rela-
tionship between the surrogate decisionmaker and others, such as the health care provid-
ers, who may be forced into the role of formal adversaries in the litigation; and it exposes
ordinarily quite private matters to the scrutiny of the courtroom and sometimes even to
the... media.") (quoting Report of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethi-
cal Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1983)).
"' See Orentlicher, supra note 57, at 2365; Ruark, Raffin & Stanford Univ. Med.
Center Comm. on Ethics, Initiating and Withdrawing Life Support, Principles and
Practice in Adult Medicine, 318 N. ENG. J. MAI. 25, 28 (1988).




having appointed a proxy decision maker.116 However, the physi-
cian alone should not be permitted to exercise the incompetent
patient's right of self-determination. 117 As one commentator
notes, physicians can pose a significant threat to patient self-
determination because "the possibility of medical malpractice
litigation or even criminal sanctions could greatly affect a physi-
cian's judgment in a treatment situation."118 Furthermore, in-
formed consent and refusal, important premises underlying
health car& decision making, would be undermined were the pro-
vider of the information, that is the physician, also deemed the
decision maker. 19
The Quinlan court suggested that it would be more appro-
priate to establish a regular forum, in the form of a hospital eth-
ics committee, which would provide input and dialogue in indi-
vidual situations and allow the responsibility for these
judgments to be shared. 20 Such committees, composed of physi-
cians, social workers, attorneys, and theologians, 21 have been es-
poused by commentators as a viable alternative to judicial in-
volvement.1 22  However, committee members, in seeking
acceptance by the group, may inadvertently avoid controversial
issues or alternatives that would prevent quick agreement.1 23
Specific guidelines could be implemented to prevent such re-
sults, but the fact remains that these ethics committees may still
116 Orentlicher, Advance Medical Directives, supra note 57, at 2367 (discussing the
physician's role in ascertaining treatment preferences). See McMillon, The Right to Ter-
minate Care, A.BA J., Oct. 1990, at 134, for a discussion of federal patient's rights legis-
lation which would require Medicare and Medicaid providers to inform their patients of
the options, in the applicable state, for advance directives. Under this measure, the pa-
tients must receive written information regarding their rights at the time of their admis-
sion to a hospital or nursing home. Commentators have referred to this new law as a
medical "Miranda warning." '91 Law Says Failing Patients Must be Told of Their Op-
tions, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1990, at A50, col. 1.
'1 Note, Do Not Resuscitate: The Failure to Protect the Incompetent Patient's
Right of Self-Determination, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 218, 237 (1989) (expressing concern
that "the physician may rely on his or her traditional expertise and preempt patient
authority").
118 Id.
11 Weir & Gostin, supra note 48, at 1848.
120 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 49, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (1976).
121 Id.
12 See Ethical Principles in Critical Care, 263 J. AMA. 696, 697 (1990); Note,
supra note 21, at 418; Weir & Gostin, supra note 48, at 1846.
12 Lo, Behind Closed Doors, Promises and Pitfalls of Ethics Committees, 317 N.
ENG. J. MED. 46, 48 (1987).
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fall victim to "groupthink. 1 , 24 Rather than permitting ethics
committees to render the final decisions regarding life-sustaining
treatment, the value of such committees is grounded more in the
important advice they can render to those entrusted with such
decisions.
In resolving cases where an agent has not been appointed,
New York should either impart the choice to the person whom
the patient himself would most likely have chosen, or leave the
decision to the patient's family.1 25 Commonsense, as well as pub-
lic opinion polls, tells us that patients would prefer to have fam-
ily members, rather than physicians, judges or legislators decide
a matter so fundamentally personal as the decision of whether to
use artificial life supports.1 28 Family members best know the pa-
tient's attitudes regarding medical treatment and life in general
since they were present as the patient developed his or her val-
ues. An individual would be most likely to convey his or her
thoughts regarding the withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment
to family members. Entrusting this decision to the patient's
family will ensure that the decision is carried out, as these are
the people who generally are most concerned with the patient's
welfare.127
Courts1 28 and commentators 29 have concluded that confer-
124 Id.
125 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126 Orentlicher, supra note 102, at 2929 (citing In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 418 n.11,
529 A.2d 434, 446-47 n.11 (1987)). The opinion polls cited in Jobes indicate that society
believes that a patient's family members should function as surrogate decision makers.
The polls cited included a.1986 nationwide poll, reported in N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1986,
at A32, col. 1. This nationwide poll showed that 73% of the 1,510 respondents approved
"withdrawing life support systems from a hopelessly ill patient if they or their family
requested it." Id. Also, 70% of the 2,000 persons, nationwide, who participated via televi-
sion in a conference on life-sustaining medical treatment at the United States Chamber
of Commerce in Washington, D.C., during the fall of 1986, "strongly agreed" that family
members should make decisions for the incompetent patient. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 418 n.11,
529 A.2d at 446-47 n.11 (citing N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1986, at CIO, col 2).
'" Jobes, 108 N.J. at 417, 529 A.2d at 445 (a desire to err on the side of preserving
life is a sentiment that family members will always consider when making treatment
decisions on behalf of relatives). Furthermore, a study revealed that spouses tend to
overestimate the amount of treatment desired by the patient, thereby safeguarding
against overly hasty withdrawal or removal of life.sustaining procedures. Orentlicher,
supra note 101, at 2929 (citing Uhlman, Pearlman & Cain, Physicians' and Spouses'
Predictions of Elderly Patients' Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J. GERoNTOLO'y 115
(1988)).
12" See Jobes, 108 N.J. at 415-16, 529 A.2d at 445 (a family member is the best
person, in most circumstances, to make treatment decisions for an incompetent patient).
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ring legal power to make health care decisions upon the incom-
petent patient's family is sufficiently justified by these advan-
tages. A court-appointed guardian, who could use the state's
powers of discovery to determine the patient's wishes, can solve
problems presented when the patient either has no close family
members or where there is concern that the patient's family will
present an unjustified, biased view. 30
The New York legislature considered the situation of in-
competent patients who do not appoint surrogates or otherwise
make their preferences known. Article 29-B of the Public Health
Law provides a method for deciding whether to issue a do-not-
resuscitate order in the event that no surrogate is designated or
available to make this decision on behalf of an incompetent
adult patient who has not expressed his or her wishes regarding
cardiopulmonary resuscitation.3 1 In these instances, the attend-
ing physician may issue an order not to treat an incompetent
patient during cardiac arrest. 32 Although it has been argued
that this section fails to promote the statutory goal of self-deter-
mination since the physician is placed under no duty to attempt
to ascertain the patient's wishes, 33 it is significant that in this
situation the legislature provided a method that avoids resort to
the judicial system. Furthermore, Article 29-B provides proce-
dures for issuing such orders in the event the patient is a mi-
nor. 34 This section does follow the standards of substituted
See also Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983)
(physician's reliance on family's wishes to terminate treatment of the incompetent pa-
tient was not unlawful); J.F.K. Memorial Hasp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984)
(close family members may refuse treatment on behalf of the incompetent patient); In re
Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (family members may exercise the rights of
the incompetent to refuse life sustaining treatment), modified on other grounds by In re
Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
"2 Note, Privacy, Family, and Medical Decision Making for Persistent Vegetative
Patients, 11 CAnRozo L. REv. 713, 721-23 (1990). One author further suggests that physi-
cians wishing to override a family's nontreatment decision should have the burden of
going to court to demonstrate that the family's decision is unreasonable. Rhoden, Liti-
gating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REv. 375, 440-41 (1988).
130 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131 N.Y. PuB. HEaLTH LAW §§ 2960-2968 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
132 Id. § 2963. The attending physician may issue an order not to resuscitate the
patient provided that the physician determines that, "to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, resuscitation would be medically futile." Id. Another physician must review
and concur with such a determination. Id.
M See Note, supra note 117, at 241.
13, N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2982(2) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
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judgment adopted elsewhere in the statute as it designates a sur-
rogate for the incompetent minor patient, that is, his or her par-
ent or legal guardian.113
The New York legislature should have followed its own pre-
cedent and provided such a procedure for individuals who either
fail to, or are not permitted, because of age or incompetency, to
execute an advance directive in the form of a health care proxy.
The statute should provide that life-sustaining procedures may
be withheld or withdrawn from incompetent patients, including
minors, if there is consultation between the attending physician
and/or a hospital ethics committee and individuals designated
on a specific list. This list of individuals legally empowered to
make treatment decisions for the incompetent patient who has
no agent should include, in order of priority: a legal guardian of
the patient, if one has been appointed; the spouse of the patient;
an adult child of the patient; a parent" of the patient; an adult
sibling of the patient; or the patient's clergy, close friend or
others with firsthand knowledge of the patient's intention.1 3 A
decision by these individuals to grant or withhold consent must
be made in the best interests of the patient, consistent with the
235 Id. § 2967(2).
131 Numerous other states have passed legislation that provides for terminating or
withholding life-sustaining treatment from minors or individuals who fail to execute a
living will or appoint a health care agent. Generally, these provisions provide a list of
individuals who shall be authorized to grant, refuse, or withdraw consent on behalf of the
patient with respect to the provision of any health care. The only restriction under these
provisions is that a witness (or witnesses) be present at the time the decision is made. In
providing these procedures, the states have found a means of avoiding judicial proceed-
ings whenever questions regarding life-sustaining treatment arise. These legislature3
have conferred legal authority upon the individuals who should be making such deci-
sions. See Arkansas Rights of the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act, ARm
STAT. ANN. § 20-17-214 (1987); Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act, CoNN.
GEN. STAT. § 19a-571 (1989); District of Columbia Health Care Decisions Act, D.C. CODE
ANN. § 21-2210 (1989); Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act, INn.
CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-14 (Burns Supp. 1989); Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, IOWA
CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West 1989); Louisiana Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, L. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5, .6 (West Supp. 1989); Maine Uniform Rights of the Termi-
nally Ill Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18a, § 5-707 (1990); New Mexico Right to Die Act,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-7-4, 7-8.1 (1986); Oregon Durable Power of Attorney for Health
Care Act, OF- REv. STAT. § 127.635 (1989) (this statute goes even further and provides
that if none of the designated persons are available, then life-sustaining treatment may
be withdrawn upon the direction and under the supervision of the attending physician);
Texas Natural Death Act, TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE AN& §§ 672.006, .009 (Vernon
1991); Virginia Natural Death Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (1988); Virginia Surrogate
Decision Making Statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (1990).
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patient's desires, if known, and in good faith. By instituting such
procedures and standards, the state can be assured that irra-
tional decisions contrary to the patient's wishes will not be
made. Such additions to the existing law would support the pol-
icy of the legislature which requires that individuals be permit-
ted to die with dignity.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court, in deciding the Cruzan
case, has affirmed that there is a right under the United States
Constitution to refuse medical treatment that survives the pa-
tient's incompetence. The New York State Legislature, by pass-
ing the health care agent and proxy law, took a giant step to-
ward ensuring that this right will be effectuated. However, while
it is true that the added anguish of legal uncertainty and confu-
sion will now be removed for patients who have created a health
care proxy, the law fails to provide any guidance for the families
or guardians of individuals who either delay appointing an agent
until it is too late or are unaware of the legal necessity for doing
so. Unfortunately, in these cases, resort to the judicial system
and the specific subjective intent standard it espouses will be
inevitable as medical providers, fearing liability for the resulting
deaths, will persist in refusing to honor the wishes of families
and guardians to terminate life-sustaining procedures without
prior court approval.
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